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I. Introduction
Private actions for damages from competition law infringements are on the rise worldwide. 1 In Europe, having remained in the shadows for long, 2 they are at the heart of the legal and policy debate since the Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Courage that 3 "The full effectiveness (…) and, in particular, the practical effect of (…) Article [101(1) TFEU 4 ]
would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition." The court's holding that "any individual" has a right to damages strikingly resembles the language in Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act 8 providing that "(…) any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor (…) and shall recover threefold the damages (…)."
However, the US courts have developed important limitations on standing, whereas the ECJ's dicta apparently exclude any outright restriction besides causality. Nonetheless, up to now the European private enforcement debate has focused almost exclusively on purchasers, 9 neglecting the numerous other parties that may incur losses due to a sellers' cartel. This paper focuses on suppliers, a group that is affected particularly frequently. While it is accepted that suppliers to a buying cartel are entitled to compensation, 10 it is mostly overlooked that suppliers to a sellers' cartel may suffer losses, too. 11 Studying whether they have standing in different legal systems offers insights into how the boundaries of the right to damages for competition law infringements are defined. This is important given that, first, private enforcement serves as a policy instrument to discourage infringements, 12 and second, international cartels often affect a diverse menu of jurisdictions with different substantive and procedural rules from which potential claimants may be able to choose to a certain extent. 13 Our analysis starts from the premise that a right to damages by suppliers to a sellers' cartel requires that, first, suppliers are worse off due to the cartel in economic terms, and that, second, the respective losses, considering the economic mechanisms that produce them, are caught by the law of damages and the law on standing in the legal system at issue. As to the first condition, section 2 explains graphically and analytically that cartel suppliers' losses are determined by a direct quantity, a price and a cost effect. Concerning the second condition, section 3 analyses from a comparative law perspective whether suppliers are entitled to claim ensuing losses as damages in the US and the EU. We argue that, whereas supplier standing is mostly denied in the US, in the EU the ECJ case law shows that the type of loss which the competition provisions are intended to prevent is broader. Importantly, the EU law guidelines on standing are complemented by national law, which will continue to be the case once the Damages Directive has entered into force. 14 We exemplify the interplay of EU-law and the law of the Member States by outlining current options for cartel supplier damage claims in England and Germany, i.e. one common law and one continental law country. Building on our results, section 4 discusses the case for and against cartel supplier damage claims in Europe, examining whether lessons can be drawn from the US approach. We conclude that the EU institutional framework allows for more generous standing for suppliers to a sellers' cartel than the US one, which offers a further option to discourage cartels and improve compensation in the EU. To show that supplier claims are also a viable option in practice, the Annex provides an econometric approach based on residual demand estimation that allows to quantify all determinants of cartel suppliers' damages.
II. First step: When do cartel suppliers suffer losses?
Damages in a comparative law & economics context
The law on cartel damages cited in the introduction indicates that a right to damages has, roughly speaking, two conditions: First, the potential claimant in question, here the supplier to a sellers' cartel, must have incurred losses that would not have occurred absent the cartel. Under a (more) economic approach to competition law, 15 this requires that economic analysis identifies effects flowing from a sellers' cartel that make a cartel supplier worse off. In a second step, it is up to legal analysis to determine whether these losses and the economic mechanisms that produce them are caught by the law of damages and the law on standing in 12 See for the EU C-557/12, Kone et al. v ÖBB Infrastruktur , not yet reported, para 23; in the US, private enforcement is explicitly ascribed the purpose to deter, whereat some argue that deterrence has even priority over compensation, see Daniel A. Crane, in: Hylton (ed.), Antitrust Law and Economics, 2010, p. 2. 13 Cf. Brealey & Green (supra note 10), paras 5.02 et seq. 14 Art. 21(1) Damages Directive, in the form of the European Parliament's legislative resolution of 17th April 2014 (supra note 9): transposition period of 2 years. 15 If the monopolist's customers start to collude on their product market, i.e. jointly maximise their profits, they charge a higher price and sell less of their output to the downstream buyers. 28 The supplier monopolist faces an ensuing fall in demand, turning his inverse demand curve inward and yielding the function . 29 The monopolist's new optimum, 24 Besides, a cartel might also influence neighbouring layers, e.g. through umbrella effects. 25 This scenario has to be distinguished from a -comparably rare -buyers' cartel in which cartel members use their market power on the demand side to force down the input price. 26 This abstracts from additional costs for other inputs to process the product, such as electricity or labour. This simplifies the analysis, but does not change the fundamental results. 27 This figure is similar to Han, Schinkel & Tuinstra (supra note 11), p. 25, who illustrate the case of an "undercharge" in a model with numerous layers up-and downstream the cartel stage.. 28 Downstream the cartel, there may be only one layer of cartel purchasers or several layers with direct and indirect purchasers. We do not specify the situation downstream the cartel but concentrate on the damages suffered by a direct cartel supplier. 29 Note that the inverse demand function does not shift, but turns inwards in case of a sellers' cartel, because we assume that the cartel members' maximum willingness to pay for inputs does not change due to collusion. Thus, graphically, the intercept of the inverse demand function remains the same. By contrast, a buyers' cartel would reduce its participants' willingness to pay and thereby cause an inward shift of the inverse demand curve.
and , is characterized by lower demand, a lower selling price and lower marginal cost. Accordingly, his losses are determined by three effects:
(1) A direct quantity effect due to the cartel members' lower input demand, illustrated by the darkly shaded rectangle between x 1 and x 2 . The effect equals the difference between the supplier's sales volumes under downstream competition and collusion, multiplied by his price-cost margin under downstream competition. The direct quantity effect is generally positive and accounts for the main part of the supplier's losses.
(2) A price effect , graphically illustrated by the greyly shaded rectangle between p 1 and p 2 . It equals the difference of the monopolist's output price under downstream competition and collusion, multiplied by the quantity sold to the downstream cartel members. In the simplified setting above, the price effect is also positive. Generally, depending on the circumstances, it might also be negative or zero.
(3) A cost effect
as a result of the supplier's lower production costs, illustrated by the lightly shaded rectangle between MC(x 1 ) and MC(x 2 ). The cost effect consists of the difference between the supplier's marginal costs when producing the output x 1 under downstream competition and x 2 under collusion, multiplied by the actual sales volume. In our example with increasing marginal costs, the effect is positive. Depending on the cost function, the effect may also be negative or zero.
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In total, the damages of a direct cartel supplier are In the model above, the cost reduction due to lower production outweighs the lower selling price ("undercharge") and counteracts the direct effect from a lower sales volume. It would thus be inappropriate and overstate the supplier's harm to measure damages by looking only at the direct quantity effect. It is worth noting, however, that if marginal costs are constant, price and cost effects vanish, and only a direct quantity effect occurs. 
General formal framework
While the example of a supplier monopolist allows for a straightforward graphical illustration, the general case with several firms on each layer is practically more relevant. The effects introduced above also exist in this scenario. To illustrate, consider a vertical production chain comprising two layers upstream the cartel, which all have a one-to-one input-output-relation. On the top layer, m identical firms (indirect cartel suppliers) produce a non-substitutable good with constant marginal costs c. They sell it at a unit price q to n identical firms in the second layer (direct cartel suppliers). The n firms process the good and sell it at unit price p to identical firms in the third layer. Abstracting from additional costs, the selling price q of the m first layer firms equals the marginal costs of the n second layer firms. Total industry output is given as 30 See Han, Schinkel & Tuinstra (supra note 11), p. 7. 31 Assuming constant marginal costs, the cost effect would completely vanish. In case of increasing economies of scale, the effect could be negative, then increasing the overall damage. 32 For a formal prove see Han, Schinkel & Tuinstra (supra note 11).
where x i2 and x j1 are quantities of a representative firm i and j on the second and first layer, respectively. Total output corresponds to the demand of the firms at the third layer, who are assumed to initially compete and subsequently collude. 33 The upstream selling prices are given as q(X) and p(q(X)): The output price at the second layer p(q(X)) depends on input costs q(X), which depend on overall quantity X. The losses two representative firms j and i in the first and the second layer incur because of the downstream sellers' cartel equal the difference between their profits under competition and collusion. The respective profits of a representative direct cartel supplier i amount to and Subtracting i2 from π i2 and rearranging parameters yields his lost profits:
Likewise, the profit of a representative indirect cartel supplier j before and after collusion is and yielding cartel induced losses of Table 1 summarizes supplier damages and decomposes them into the quantity-, price-and cost effects described above: 
Indirect Supplier
Quantity effect Price effect Cost effect - 33 We assume that all firms either collude or compete. Firms are therefore assumed not only to be identical with respect to production costs and other firm characteristics, but also to take concurrent decisions about whether to form a cartel. 34 Likewise, in what follows we use the shortcuts and instead of and .
Compared to the graphical illustration, three aspects of this general case should be noted: First, as in the scenario of a supplier monopolist, lower input demand by downstream cartel members may cause either higher upstream prices, lower prices or no price change at all. However, irrespective of the model specific assumptions, the most obvious strategic reaction of direct and indirect suppliers to decreasing demand is to lower their own output prices in order to mitigate and counteract the loss in demand. Second, assuming that m = n and = , the price effect of the indirect supplier and the cost effect of the direct supplier exactly match. The direct supplier loses from lower sales but takes advantage of lower input costs. The indirect cartel supplier does not face a cost effect if marginal costs are constant at the top layer. Therefore, he or she is more vulnerable to the direct quantity effect. Third, the number of firms on each upstream layer strongly influences suppliers' damages. Assuming Cournot competition, the direct quantity effect sustained by one cartel supplier is decreasing in the number of symmetric cartel suppliers in the market. As a result, the followon effects on prices and costs are also decreasing in the level of competition on the upstream layers.
III. Second step: Can cartel suppliers claim their losses as damages?
Having identified the economic determinants for suppliers' losses due to a downstream sellers' cartel, the crucial question is whether these losses and their underlying effects are caught by the law of damages and the law on standing. Naturally, different legal systems, depending on the institutional framework, may answer this question in different ways.
US federal law a) General standard for standing
The wording of Sec. 4 Clayton Act cited in the introduction seems to encompass every harm, 35 but is only superficially clear. 36 Actually, the US courts have declined to interpret the statute literally. 37 The Supreme Court argued in Associated General Contractors, the leading case on antitrust standing, 38 that the legislative history of Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act requires construing the provision in the light of its common-law background and the contemporary legal context in which Congress acted. 39 The court concluded that -contrary to the wordingthe remedy cannot encompass every harm which can be traced to alleged wrongdoing. Over time, a two-pronged approach has developed to limit the universe of potential plaintiffs: 40 First, the plaintiff must have suffered "antitrust injury", defined as "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants' (supra note 37), 457 U.S. 465, 479, stating that the "availability of the § 4 remedy (…) is not a question of the specific intent of the conspirators", but then noting that the plaintiff suffered from the "very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to achieve its illegal ends. The harm to McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy." 46 suppliers suffer antitrust injury, since the greater the output restriction, the greater the loss of sales by suppliers. 59 He denies standing, however, arguing that these harms resulted from the violator's attempt to minimize costs and were entirely offset by a cost saving to the defendant. They were thus caused by a neutral aspect of the violation rather than by the welfare loss to consumers, so that classifying them as damages would cause overdeterrence. 60 This reasoning is subject to two objections: First, it raises the question how to justify the departure from ordinary law of damages, where a tortfeasor must indemnify (causal and proximate 61 )
damages irrespective of whether they are mere welfare transfers. 62 Second, it is imprecise: In the terminology of part II above, only the direct quantity effect and the price effect are pure welfare transfers from suppliers to cartel members, whereas the cost effect, if negative, 63 may imply welfare losses to society that do not translate into higher prices for cartel customers.
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A more convincing variant of the argument denies antitrust injury. Areeda & Hovenkamp discuss the example of a merger which prompts the partners to increase prices, to reduce output and correspondingly input demand. They argue that, although suppliers suffer a loss from reduced sales due to the reduction in defendant's output that is the reason for condemning the merger, this effect was "a by-product of the illegal merger rather than the rationale for making it illegal". Such a loss fell short of being antitrust injury, as the injury occurred in another market than the lessening of competition that makes a defendant's This case law display an inherent tension: On the one hand the apodictic demand to enable "any individual" to claim compensation, on the other hand the apparently remarkable leeway for national law. Against this background, the fundamental question which properties characterize "any person" that must be able to claim damages is not straightforward to answer. The issue is complicated by the fact that a potential claimant's right to sue depends, first, on the (minimum) conditions for liability determined by community law, i.e. the existence of a right to damages, and, second, the exercise of that right pursuant to national law subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 77 However, the ECJ's recent important judgment in the Kone case indicates that the EU law right to damages of any individual adversely affected works forcefully against any inflexible standing limitations which come on top of technical causality. The case concerned a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof in an action for damages by an umbrella plaintiff, ÖBB Infrastruktur. ÖBB claimed that it had bought the cartelized product from non-cartel members at a higher price than it would have paid but for the existence of the cartel, on the ground that those third undertakings benefited from the existence of the cartel in adapting their prices to the inflated level. 78 The ECJ repeated that, while it is, in principle, for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing actions for damages, national legislation must ensure that European Union competition law is fully effective. The national rules must therefore, according to the ECJ, specifically take into account the objective of Article 101 TFEU, which aims to guarantee effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, and, accordingly, prices set on the basis of free competition. 79 The ECJ went on to assert that the full effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU would be put at risk if the right of any individual to claim compensation were subjected by national law, categorically and regardless of the particular circumstances of the case, to the existence of a direct causal link, thereby excluding umbrella plaintiffs. 80 According to the ECJ, it follows that the victim of umbrella pricing may obtain compensation for the loss caused by the cartel members where it is established that the cartel at issue was, in the specific case at hand, liable to have the effect of umbrella pricing by 73 In any case, it should be noted that the case at hand in Manfredi concerned end-consumers in a direct contractual relationship with the cartel members, although the contract was arranged through brokers. Therefore, neither the passing-on defence nor indirect purchaser standing came into play on the merits. This is sometimes overlooked; for instance Cengiz, opt cit., at p. 52 mistakenly writes that the ECJ has faced the question of granting standing to indirect purchasers.
damages. 86 Others stress that the ECJ has accepted certain limitations. 87 In particular, national courts may deny a party damages to prevent unjust enrichment insofar as an infringement produced gains that offset losses claimed, 88 and/or if that party bears significant responsibility for the distortion of competition. 89 Taking up this case law, the majority of commentators hold the view that EU law allows to restrict the universe of potential claimants for reasons of remoteness, 90 albeit usually without specifying this rather vague concept. In the Kone case, Advocate General Kokott did further elaborate on its delineation. She argued that the European Union law conditions applicable to the establishment of a causal link are to ensure: First, that a person who has acted unlawfully is liable only for such loss as he could reasonably have foreseen, and that, secondly, a person is liable only for loss the compensation of which is consistent with the objectives of the provision of law which he has infringed. 91 Concerning the second point, Advocate General
Kokott examined whether awarding compensation for the losses at issue would fit in the existing system of public and private competition law enforcement in the EU and whether a damage award would be a suitable measure to correct the negative consequences of the competition law infringement. 92 However, the subsequent ECJ judgment only briefly mentioned the aspect of foreseeability: As to the compatibility with the enforcement system, the ECJ simply -rightly in our view -stated that the leniency programme cannot deprive individuals of the right to obtain compensation for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.
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Apart from remoteness, other causality defences might be mounted against a competition law action for damages. Several of these are in dispute, in particular the defence that the anticompetitive behaviour is no conditio sine qua non if the injury would have been sustained even in the case of lawful behaviour, and the argument that the victim could have avoided or minimized the damage by taking precautionary action. First, it is not sufficient for the claimant to show that the defendant's breach was a causa sine qua non, i.e. that the loss would not have occurred but for the breach. Rather, the tortious conduct must have been a cause that, from a normative point of view, is considered material enough to justify damages. This requires that -the breach was a substantial, direct or effective cause that cannot be ignored for the purpose of legal liability, 113 -the loss was not caused by the claimants own mismanagement or another intervening cause, 114 which will probably require a supplier to show that the cartel members did not cut supplies from him for other commercial reasons (such as quality), and that -the injury is sufficiently proximate. 115 Second, and probably the crucial hurdle for cartel suppliers, a claimant who sues for breach of statutory duty must in principle show that the duty was owed to him, meaning (1) that the statute imposes a duty for the benefit of the individual harmed, and that (2) the duty was in respect of the kind of loss suffered. 116 In Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company the defendant raised this issue as a defence before the Court of Appeal, referring -apart from English authorities -to the doctrine of antitrust injury as stated by the Supreme Court in Brunswick. 117 The defendant argued that the claimant need not only prove a causal link between the illegal distortion of competition at hand and the loss, but also that the loss was of a type Art. 101(1) intended to prevent. The defendant disputed this because Crehan had not suffered from restricted competition in the market for the supply of beer to on-trade outlets, which made the tying arrangement at issue violate Art. 101 TFEU, but from the beer tie distorting competition with other pubs free of tie. The Court of Appeal accepted "as a matter of English law" that the duty breached must be in respect of the kind of loss suffered. 118 However, English law must be interpreted such that liability is imposed where required by EU law. 119 The Court of Appeal therefore rejected the argument in the case at hand, inferring from the ECJ's preliminary ruling that Community law conferred onto Crehan a right to the type of damages claimed. 120 The case law leaves thus open whether the English law principle can ever apply in the context of European competition law. 121 In any case, the principle cannot be applied narrowly: In particular, the ECJ judgment in Courage shows that a right to damages does not require that the loss occurred in the same market as the illegal restriction of competition. Some commentators conclude that the requirement that the statute imposes a duty for the benefit of the individual harmed is always satisfied in cases involving Art. 101 and 102 TFEU. 127 The claimant must prove its allegations on the balance of probabilities, whereat, the more unlikely the alleged infringement, the stronger the evidence must be to establish it. Furthermore, the claimant must demonstrate that the anti-competitive behaviour caused the loss suffered, which does not require the same high evidentiary standard than the proof of the infringement, see legal entities that are potentially adversely affected in their market behaviour 133 by a competition law infringement. 134 The legislator explicitly intended suppliers to belong to these 'other market participants', regardless of whether the cartel deliberately aimed at them. 135 This seems widely accepted 136 and includes direct and -subject to remotenessindirect suppliers. After much controversy concerning the passing-on defense, 137 the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) endorsed it in 2012, holding that the group of potential claimants is restricted only by the requirement of a causal link between the illegal cartel and the damages claimed. 138 There are thus good reasons to conclude that lost profits of suppliers resulting from an output reduction by the cartel members are in principle recoverable as damages pursuant to German law. 139 It should however be noted that some legal uncertainty remains. In particular, according to a view that relies on the government's statement of reasons (Regierungsbegründung) concerning the reform act, a market participant is only entitled to damages if there is a more than accidental link, an inner coherence between the reasons that make the defendants conduct a competition law violation and the adverse effect on the market participant (so called Zurechnungs-oder Rechtswidrigkeitszusammenhang). 140 This might be used to exclude cartel suppliers. 141 Besides, there are doubts whether claims by suppliers are enforceable in practice. Sometimes they are deemed to be speculative in nature and very unlikely to be proven. 142 In particular, similar to England, the defendant's action need not only be a conditio sine qua non for the loss (äquivalente Kausalität), but damages must also be attributable to the defendant from a normative point of view (adäquate Kausalität). Besides, a competition law infringement is not considered causal for damages that would have occurred but for the infringement, too.
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The supplier must therefore show that the cartel member(s) had bought more inputs just from him (i.e. not from a competing supplier). This task is however alleviated by the legal presumption of lost profits in sec. 252 of the German Civil Code (BGB) 144 if the supplier could reasonably expect to sell a certain quantity to the cartel members, e. g. because of a stable customer-client relationship.
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IV. The case for and against cartel supplier standing in the EU
Lessons from the US?
In view of the open questions concerning the scope of the right to damages for infringements of EU competition law on the one hand, and the considerable experience gained with intense private enforcement in the US on the other, it suggests itself to ask whether the US approach to supplier standing could -in whole or in part -be a model for private enforcement in the EU. This crucially depends on the comparability of the framework conditions in the legal systems.
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Standing limitations in the US are to a large extent explained by the draconian treble damages remedy. Combined with opt-out class-actions, pre-trial discovery and contingency fees, it makes claims for damages very attractive for purported victims, implying a high risk of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment. 147 In the US, it is therefore essential to tightly limit the universe of potential plaintiffs. If, as a collateral consequence, some damages are not recoverable, automatic trebling can in principle make up for such a slippage.
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Tellingly, when treble-damages are no concern, the US courts adopt a more liberal approach to standing. This holds in particular for sec. 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 26) 149 which provides for injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief is granted by courts of equity. Insofar the courts are less concerned about whether the plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. This is because the dangers of mismanaging them are less pervasive, 150 given that there is no risk of duplicative recovery an no danger of complex apportionment that pervade the analysis of standing under sec. 4 Clayton Act.
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143 Bechtold (supra note 128), § 33 para 27 144 Sec. 252 BGB sentence 1 provides that the damage to be compensated for also comprises the lost profits. Sentence 2 adds that those profits are considered lost that in the normal course of events or in the special circumstances, particularly due to the measures and precautions taken, could probably be expected. 145 Besides, this might be the case if the supplier produced inputs specifically designed for the needs of the cartel firms. 146 Cir. 1991) . While the standing is therefore less restrictive for a plaintiff seeking an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must allege threatened injury that would constitute antitrust injury in the same way as in a claim for damages. This is to prevent contradicting results, because, as the Supreme Court put it, "would be anomalous (...) to read the Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure an In a similar vein, even if to a somewhat lesser extent, the risks of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment are less important in the EU compared to the US, as the EU Member States provide for punitive or exemplary damages only exceptionally 152 and, while providing for certain collective action mechanisms, reject US-style opt-out class actions. 153 Moreover, a loser-pays rule applies to the costs of trial. In such an institutional framework, only those who suffered significant and provable losses have an incentive to sue for damages. Therefore, in the EU, compared to the US, more persons that might suffer losses from a cartel can confidently be granted a right to damages. In certain respects, this is already current case law.
In particular, as Crehan shows, in the EU, unlike in the US, a right to damages does not require the loss to occur in the same market than the lessening of competition that makes the defendant's conduct illegal. It follows that the type of loss which the competition provisions are intended to prevent is broader in the EU than in the US.
The purpose of a right to damages as the guiding principle for standing
The insight that the EU framework allows for more generous standing leads to the question how the scope of the right to claim damages should be delimited in the EU. The key to the answer, in our opinion, is to be found in the purpose the legal system assigns to that right. In the US, a major purpose of private actions for damages is to deter antitrust law violations:
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Private plaintiffs are enlisted as "private attorney generals" 155 to complement the resources of the antitrust authorities. Such a utilitarian perspective justifies restricting standing to those who can efficiently enforce the antitrust laws, even if this means that some victims remain uncompensated, while others receive windfall profits. 156 The same result is hard to justify in a , currently no member state provides for opt-out class actions for damages with respect to competition law infringements. In the UK, the BIS however wants to introduce collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) as part of the Draft Consumer Rights Bill (supra note 68). The CAT would authorize such actions as opt-in or opt-out proceedings (sec. 47B (7)(c) Draft Consumer Rights Bill). It remains to be seen whether this part of the Bill will be enacted. In any case, opt-out collective actions would include only class members domiciled in the UK (cf. sec. 47B (11) (b)); in all collective actions, an award of exemplary damages would be excluded (sec. 47C(1)), damages based agreements (contingency fees) prohibited (sec. 47C(7)), the loser pays rule would apply and a damage award, insofar as it is not claimed by the class members, would have to paid to the charity (sec. 47C(5)). The proposal thus differs considerably from the US class action system. 154 156 Even if the injury of one potential claimant is truly "inextricably intertwined" with injury of another, the Supreme Court may decide that either of them, but not both may recover, to avoid the risk of duplicative recovery and the practical problems inherent in distinguishing the losses suffered, see Illinois Brick Co. v.
legal system like the EU where damages fulfil at least equally a compensatory purpose. 157 In view of this goal, awards should mirror the claimant's losses as closely as possible, whereas inaccuracy can create injustice. 
The case for supplier standing in the EU
On the basis of the guiding principle just proposed, there are several arguments to suggest that damages of direct suppliers to a sellers' price cartel should be recoverable pursuant to EU law. First, as shown above, suppliers regularly suffer losses from a cartel, and thereby come within the scope of "any individual" in the words of the ECJ. Second, full compensation as an at least equal purpose of competition law actions for damages 159 requires covering all losses accurately and precisely, as long as no exception is justified. Four justifications seem particularly relevant: (1) remoteness -if damages are remote, litigation is costly and prone to errors that impair prevention (deterrence); 160 (2) unjust enrichment -in this case the plaintiff would receive a windfall undefendable from a corrective justice point of view; 161 (3) the victim itself bears significant responsibility for the infringement -then allowing for damages would create an ex-ante incentive to contravene the law; (4) the victim could have easily and cheaply avoided the damage -then allowing for compensation would encourage socially inefficient behaviour. 162 Neither of these Third, recognizing suppliers as eligible claimants suits well with the ECJ case law that, notwithstanding the compensatory purpose, assigns the community law right to damages a preventive purpose, too. 165 In Kone, the ECJ made clear that national legislation on the right to claim damages, including the aspect who can (not) bring a successful claim, must ensure that European Union competition law is fully effective. National law must specifically take into account the objective to guarantee effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, and, accordingly, prices set on the basis of free competition. 166 Advocate General van Gerven has even posited that Community law requires the civil law consequences themselves, in particular the right to damages of any individual, to have a deterrent effect (instead of only contributing to discourage infringements). 167 Given that not all infringements are detected and that not all victims of detected infringements sue, single damages will arguably only make a significant contribution to preventing infringements if the class of eligible claimants is not defined narrowly. This suggests that direct and indirect cartel suppliers should in principle have a right to damages. 168 Such a broad definition of potential claimants would also fit well with the ECJ case law in other fields. In particular, the ECJ has enlisted EU citizens as supervisors over the decentralized enforcement of EU law by granting citizens generous standards for standing to sue the Member States for benefits that flow from EU law. 
Objections
While there are thus, in our view, good arguments for granting suppliers of price cartels an EU law based right to damages, there are also some important counterarguments. However, not all of these are convincing.
a) Supplier damages reflective?
First, suppliers' damages from a sellers' cartel could at first blush considered to be reflective, in the sense of merely mirroring the competition law infringement in relation to cartel customers: 170 customers pay higher prices and therefore buy less, the quantity reduction affecting the whole production chain. This view is however too simplistic. As shown in part II, suppliers primarily suffer a direct quantity effect, reflected in a decrease of sales. This effect will usually not translate into customer damage claims, because those customers priced out of the market (potential customers) are often not able to show and prove damages: End-consumers who did not buy (or bought less) do not even suffer damages in the legal sense, as the law acknowledges only monetary losses or lost profits, not losses of utility. At best, cartel customers at intermediate layers of the production chain could claim lost profits if they overcome difficulties of proof. 171 But when calculating the lost profits of such claimants, their foregone earnings must be reduced by their hypothetical input costs that comprise all profit margins (hypothetically) charged by upstream firms. As a consequence, even if cartel customers claim lost profits with respect to units not bought, their damages do not include the direct quantity effect suffered by suppliers.
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Cartel customers primarily claim the overcharge, i.e. the price increase for the units actually produced and sold. As shown above, with respect to these units cartel suppliers may face a positive or a negative price effect. (Only) a price decrease ("undercharge") contributes to suppliers' damages. By contrast, such an effect does not add to consumer damages: Either the cartel passes on the lower input costs, which then reduce the overcharge and thereby consumer damages, or the cartel retains the decrease in input costs to achieve a higher margin, which again does not increase consumer damages, because the overcharge is calculated with reference to the (input) price under competition.
On the other hand, while the price effect for suppliers fits easily within the basic legal definition of damages -suppliers face losses that would not have occurred but for the cartel, which is a proximate cause (condition sine qua non) -the price effect mitigates the cartel's overall negative welfare effects. 173 From a law and economics perspective, one might therefore advocate accepting only the direct quantity effect, not the price effect, as a 170 If a certain head of damage can occur only once and can therefore be attributed only alternatively or in part, but not cumulatively, to the different levels of the production chain, it can be claimed only by one level of the production chain, while others claims are excluded, cf. BGH, case KZR 75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier ("ORWI"), NJW 2012, 928, 933, paras 60, 171 Potential purchasers have to prove that they would have bought (more) from the cartel members if the price would have been at a competitive level, which will often be very difficult and is even deemed highly speculative, see Wils (supra note 158), p. 487; Crane, in: Hylton (supra note 44), p. 1, 15. A successful claim might be possible if the affected buyer was in a stable customer-client relationship with the cartel members. 172 This reasoning refers to potential cartel customers that would have bought the cartelized product at the competitive price, but refrain from buying for the inflated price because this price exceeds their willingness to pay. Note, however, that there may be some umbrella firms (competitors of the cartel members not part of the cartel) that offer their product at some discount to the cartelized price, though they will usually charge more than the competitive price. There might be then a part of the potential cartel customers whose willingness to pay is lower than the cartel prize, but higher than the competitive price. Insofar as the willingness to pay of these potential customers is also higher or equal to the price charged by the umbrella firms, they might switch to them, though they are still likely to lower their demand. Insofar as potential customers switch to umbrella firms, their damages are the difference between the competitive price and the price charged by the umbrella firms. According to the ECJ's reasoning in Kone, this translated, at least in principle, into a right to damages against the cartel members. Insofar, the same reasoning applies as for direct cartel customers (see the following paragraph in the main text). 173 component of suppliers' damages. 174 However, there are at least two important counterarguments: First, in view of the fact that cartels cause ripples of harm to flow through the economy, it is not to be expected that all those who suffer from welfare losses actually claim damages. It would therefore not appear convincing to restrict the legal notion of damages for efficiency reasons to the disadvantage of those who are sufficiently proximate to the cartel and thereby good positioned to bring a claim. Second, sticking to the traditional legal notion of damages would increase legal certainty for supplier claims and fit well with the ECJ case law that attaches also a preventive purpose to competition law actions for damages.
b) The goal of competition law: Consumer welfare vs. supplier losses?
The argument of supplier damages being merely reflective could at most have some force from a normative perspective if one considers consumer welfare to be the primary goal of European community competition law and -based on this -losses to upper levels of the production chain to be immaterial. However, such a view seems hardly tenable since the EJC has held in GlaxoSmithKline that Article 101 TFEU aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such. 175 Therefore, according to the ECJ, for a finding that an agreement has an anticompetitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price. 176 Against this background, it cannot be argued that damages to upper levels of the production chain do not matter. Actually, in certain scenarios such as the one in GlaxoSmithKline, awarding non-consumers a right to damages may even be crucial for having private enforcement at all.
c) Limited protective purpose of EU competition law?
A more substantial counterargument is to say that, in a normative sense, suppliers of price cartels do not (directly) suffer from decreasing competition. The cartel restricts competition in the selling market to the detriment of its customers, not in the buying market. The harms to suppliers result from the cartel members' efforts to minimize costs in response to a lower demand for their product. In the US, a similar reasoning serves to deny antitrust injury to suppliers. 177 
V. Conclusion
Private enforcement of competition law is on the rise worldwide and has been on top of the agenda of European competition policy for almost one and a half decades now. However, while actions for damages by cartel customers have received much attention, the numerous other parties that may incur losses due to a cartel are usually neglected. In particular, suppliers to a downstream price cartel have mostly been overlooked so far. Such suppliers incur losses subject to three effects: Cartel members lower sales and correspondingly their input demand (direct quantity effect), which in turn affects the price suppliers can charge for their product (price effect) and their production costs (cost effect). Whether suppliers are legally entitled to damages for such losses is however a difficult question. While the EU and the US both seem to generously grant damages to "any individual" or "any person" harmed by a cartel, the standards on supplier standing actually diverge: In the US, though a clear and consistent body of case law on supplier standing is missing, the current majority view denies standing. By contrast, the emerging position in the EU arguably is to grant suppliers a right to damages. In particular, if follows from the case law in Courage v. Crehan that in the EU, unlike in the US, a right to damages caused by a competition law infringement does not require the loss to occur in the same market than the lessening of competition that makes the defendant's conduct illegal. The type of loss which the competition provisions are intended to prevent is therefore broader in the EU than in the US, although many details are still open. This affects the laws of the EU Member States that, subject to the EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness, currently govern action for damages. Indeed, both Germany and England have abandoned important traditional limitations on standing in order to comply with the ECJ case law. We argue that it is possible to justify a more liberal approach to standing in the EU compared to the US in view of the different institutional context and the goals assigned to the right to damages in the EU. This view suggests that cartel suppliers in principle have a right to damages, as no general restrictions on standing ought to apply. The causation requirement will be one of the main hurdles to clear for them. Sound econometric estimation techniques are of major importance to overcome this obstacle. In this respect, the Annex shows that damages of a specific supplier can be estimated with a residual demand model that is adjusted for the emergence of a downstream cartel.
Annex
The preceding analysis shows that there are good reasons to conclude that cartel suppliers have a community law based right to damages. Regarding the exercise of that right, the case law in Courage and Manfredi points to national civil law with respect to the standard of proof and the extent of damages recoverable. The crucial challenge is to determine the damages in question. This requires a sound empirical approach that enables victims to prove their losses and courts to sort out unfounded claims with sufficient precision. Concerning the direct quantity effect, it is necessary to estimate a specific suppliers' decrease in sales volume due to the downstream cartel. This can be done by estimating a residual demand model for this specific supplier that takes the emergence of the cartel into account.
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The residual demand function captures the demand a specific supplier faces after the reaction of all other supplier-firms is taken into account. Hence, the residual demand function accounts for the strategic interdependency between competing suppliers, i.e. the fact that a change by one firm prompts the other firms in the same (e.g. supplier-)market to adjust their prices as well. Assume that the demand a cartel supplier faces in the market for its product (the input for the cartelized good) is given by 181 
where is the unit price firm charges for its product, a vector of prices charged by all other suppliers-competitors, a vector of demand shifters and a cartel binary variable (dummy) measuring demand changes due to the emergence of a downstream cartel. The first order condition of profit maximization provides the best-reply function of firm , ,
where represents a vector of industry specific cost variables and firm specific costs of firm . The best-reply function denotes the optimal output price for firm for given prices of all other firms. 182 Likewise, the vector of best-reply functions of all other firms is given as .
Substituting vector (3) into firm 's demand function (1) yields the residual demand function for firm :
.
Note that since prices and quantities are jointly determined, the residual demand function must be estimated with a two-stage-least-squares instrumental variable (IV-) estimation. A suitable instrument for is , because firm specific costs of firm are generally correlated with but uncorrelated with the residuals. 183 The econometric implementation of the second stage of an IV-estimation of the residual demand function (4) is then given as follows:
184 (5) is the estimated price obtained from the first stage IV-estimation 185 , a binary variable equal to one during the cartel period and zero otherwise, and , and vectors of exogenous variables that affect demand, industry specific cost variables and firm specific cost drivers from firms other than firm . The approach used to determine the quantity effect is equivalent to the before-and-after method for overcharge estimations. In the present context, it compares pre-and/or post cartel sales to the sales of the supplier during collusion, relying on the assumption that the competitive situation in the market but for the cartel would have evolved similar to the situation before and/or after collusion. The estimation therefore requires data of the respective variables from the cartel period as well as the non-cartel period.
186 182 The underlying assumption of this approach is that supplier i behaves like a Stackelberg-leader in the supplier market. 183 See Motta (supra note 181), p. 127. 184 Note that the model is not specified as a panel but as a time series. As before, the subscripts i and -i indicate whether the respective variables refer to firm i or all other firms. The subscript t indicates the time dimension (weekly, monthly or yearly). 185 In the first stage of the two-stage-least-squares IV estimation is regressed on as well as all other righthand side variables included in the second stage. Although not specified here, the first stage regression results also constitute a test for whether is correlated with , i.e. whether can be used as instrument for . The average output reduction incurred by the cartel supplier per period during cartelization is now given by the estimated coefficient , and the harm associated with the quantity effect (as described in section II 2) amounts to .
The first term sums up the output decreases over the entire cartel period, and is then multiplied by the price-cost margin earned by the cartel supplier in the counterfactual competitive scenario. The price-cost margin can be estimated by means of supplier 's residual demand elasticity, as we will show during the following analysis of the remaining determinants of a supplier's overall damage, the price and cost effect. 187 These effects shown in Table 1 (section II 2, p.6) are given by , which can be rewritten as .
Expression (7) corresponds to the difference between the supplier's price-cost margin under competition and under collusion, multiplied by the quantity sold to the cartel members during collusion. To quantify the price and cost effect, it is therefore necessary to estimate the pricecost margin of the supplier for both regimes. This can be done by means of firm 's Lerner Index of market power, given as , where denotes the residual demand elasticity faced by supplier in the supplier market. The Lerner Index relates the firm's mark-up to the price charged by the firm. In case of perfect competition in the supply market, the Lerner Index is zero, suggesting that no price and cost effects occur. With increasing market power the Lerner Index increases up to the theoretical maximum value of 1 under monopolization. We can derive the residual demand elasticities for both periods of time (collusion and noncollusion) by estimating a slightly different version of the residual demand model described above (equation (5) The only difference to model (5) is that both quantity and instrumented price of the supplier are in logarithm and that an additional interaction term between instrumented price and carteltime dummy is included. The residual elasticity of demand during and outside the cartel period for supplier is now given as , with 187 Alternatively, the price-cost margin could also be determined with the help of accounting data. 188 Again, model (8) reflects the second stage of a two-stage-least-squares estimation. For information on the first stage regression, see footnote 185.
The estimated demand elasticities in the cartel and the non-cartel period combined with price data of the cartel supplier make it possible to calculate price-cost margins, which can then be used to jointly calculate the price and cost effect as defined in expression (7). 189 The estimated price-cost margin during the competitive period additionally completes the calculation of the direct quantity effect as stated in (6). In principle, the approach described in this section could also be applied to a group of firms, for instance a group of (supplier-) claimants. One then would have to treat this group as one single firm in the market and estimate the residual demand for the entire group. However, such an approach is subject to at least one important disadvantage: Unlike purchasers who are generally exposed to the same price effect, cartel suppliers might encounter substantially different quantity effects. To illustrate, assume that the cartel members decrease their input demand by 10 percent due to the infringement. They might then either reduce their input demand equally by 10 percent with respect to each supplier, or cut demand to a greater extent or even to quit the business relationship with respect to certain suppliers only. In an extreme case, this might even entail a larger input demand from other suppliers in order to receive bulk discounts. Hence, unlike in the case of an average overcharge, it is critical to suppose that a general decrease in residual demand of 10 percent harms all suppliers equally by a 10 percent reduction in sales. If this assumption is not warranted, separate estimations for each supplier are preferable.
